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REAL RISKS IN A VIRTUALIZED WORLD: HOW VIRTUALIZATION IS CHANGING THE
WAY WE MANAGE, ASSESS, AND MITIGATE RISK
Brian Boyer, Fort Hays State University
Keyu Jiang, Fort Hays State University
Robert Meier, Fort Hays State University
Hongbiao Zeng, Fort Hays State University

A dramatic shift has started to take place in the last decade that is having a pronounced impact on how organizations view
information security. Large datacenters and small server rooms alike are being impacted by the development and growth
of virtualization and the many benefits it provides. This essay will examine how hardware virtualization has changed the
landscape of datacenter risk management and how organizations must adapt their security posture to those changes. As
mainstream hypervisors like VMware ESXi, Citrix XenServer, and Microsoft Hyper-V become more affordable and easier
to implement, their use in providing lpw-cost, high-utilization solutions is steadily becoming an industry standard, even
for smaller shops. Organizations must understand how to assess, manage, and mitigate new types of risk unique to
virtualization. By examining the technology behind virtualization, the risks associated with it, and the methods
organizations can use to mitigate and minimize those risks, we will see that virtualization, when implemented properly,
can provide a secure, highly beneficial technology on which datacenters can be built.
INTRODUCTION

Though virtualization provides a number of benefits, it
is not without issues, and security is at the top of the list
(Price, 2008). One of the most common pitfalls during the
introduction of any new technology is that security is
considered only as an afterthought. Rather than building it
into the planning and testing phases, too often security
considerations are left for after the technology deployment is
nearing completion or even already in production. This can
cause considerable difficulty and cost if the technology is
implemented using inappropriate security practices, and
therefore must be refashioned in order to adhere to the
organization's security policies. Virtualization is no
exception to this pitfall. Gartner predicts that 60% of
virtualized servers will be less secure than their physical
counterparts through 2012. In this essay we will examine
the benefits and risks associated with virtualization in order
to determine if it truly presents a secure, long-term solution
for enterprise and small business server deployments. Much
has been written about the advantages of virtualization, but
what sort of vulnerabilities are associated with it, and are
those vulnerabilities worth the risk? What security controls
should be implemented in order to mitigate vulnerabilities
unique to virtualization? This essay will shed light on
virtualization's unique security issues and identify the
appropriate steps for minimizing its vulnerabilities and
properly deploying a virtual infrastructure. In so doing, we
will see that virtualization, if implemented properly, may not
only be a paradigm shift changing the way we think about
datacenters and computing (Hau, 2007), but also the way we
manage, assess, and mitigate datacenter risk.

A dramatic shift has taken place in the last decade that
is having a pronounced impact on how organizations view
information security. Experts predict that by 2012
approximately 50% of x86 server workloads will be
virtualized (Gartner, 2009). It's a phenomenon that is
undoubtedly gaining momentum. Gartner's Phil Dawson
went so far as to state that visualization will be " the highestimpact issue challenging infrastructure and operations
through 20 15" (Gartner, 20 I 0). Though virtualization as a
technology has been around since the 1960s when IBM
developed it for use with its large mainframes (Reuben,
2007), a number of factors have led to its marked increase
over the last decade. First, the cost of hardware to support
virtualization has gotten significantly smaller in recent years
as processor, memory, and storage components have
advanced (Koomey, Belady, Patterson, & Santos, 2009).
The power oftoday's hardware has outpaced operating
system (OS) and application utilization so much that most
resources go unused. Second, the development of
processors designed specifically for virtualization, like the
Intel VT and AMD SMV processors (Perez, van Doorn, &
Sailer, 2008), along with the development of x86 virtual host
operating systems (VM Tech, 2010), like VMware's ESXi
and Microsoft's Hyper-V, has made virtualization available
to organizations that previously couldn't afford it. Third, the
benefit organizations get from rolling out a virtual
environment, such as better utilization of hardware, lower
maintenance and renewal costs, increased availability and
portability, and a smaller carbon footprint, have spurred
CIOs around the globe to hang their reputation (and their
company's bottom line) on virtualization's very real benefits
(Pias, 2007).
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VffiTUALIZATION AND ITS MANY BENEFITS

magic from its ability to present the guest operating system
abstracted hardware. The guest in tum "sees" the abstracted
hardware as if it were actual hardware. It is unaware that it
is being presented "virtual" resources, including virtual
CPU(s), memory, network interface card(s), and storage.
Therefore, multiple guest operating systems can sit on one
physical server, each unaware of the other it is sharing
resources with other VMs on the same physical machine.
Examples of hardware virtualization include VMware's ESX
and ESXi, Microsoft's Hyper-V, and Citrix's XenServer.
With the second type of virtualization, called software
virtualization, the hypervisor runs as an application on a
standard OS, such as Windows or Linux. It doesn't have
direct control over the physical hardware (Price, 2009), and
therefore the hypervisor is dependent on the traditional OS
for access to the hardware. Resources are therefore
emulated rather than abstracted. This type of virtualization
is primarily used in testing and development environments
and typically not used in production. Examples include
VMware's VMware Workstation, Microsoft's Virtual PC,
and Parallels Desktop 5. The Figure provides a visual
representation of the differences between hardware
virtualization abstraction and the emulation of software
virtualization.

In order to accurately evaluate its unique risks, we must
first have some understanding of how virtualization works.
As mentioned earlier, virtualization as a technology has been
around since the 1960's when IBM developed it for use with
its large mainframes (Reuben, 2007). However, the largest
share oftoday's market is comprised of two types of
virtualization technology (IDC, 2010). The first is called
hardware virtualization, or ful l virtualization, and is the
primary focus of this paper. The three core components of
hardware virtualization are the host OS, which enables
booting and provides a local management interface into the
system; the hypervisor, or virtual machine monitor (VMM)
as it is sometimes called; and the guest operating systems, or
virtual machines (VMs). The hypervisor is "a thin software
layer" (Price, 2009) which runs on top of the host OS. Its
primary purpose is to manage resource allocation and task
scheduling for the guest virtual machines. It is responsible
for presenting abstracted hardware to the guests, and for
controlling the flow of instructions between that hardware
and the guest OSs. The hypervisor is also capable of
partitioning the host's physical resources in such a way that
the VMs are isolated from one another, so that they only
have access to their own resources. The hypervisor gets its

FIGURE
Representation of the Difference between Hardware and Software Virtualization
(Solarvps, 2010)

There is strong statistical evidence that virtualization
now plays a prominent role in the implementation plans of
many organizations' datacenters (Gartner, 20 I 0). A recent
CDW survey of 387 IT executives from organizations with
100 or more employees found that more than 90% of those

surveyed said they had begun implementation of
virtualization at some level (Caraher, 2010). There is a
reason why virtualization is being implemented at such an
astounding rate and why it has become a hotbed for research
and literature- the many benefits it provides saves
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organizations time and money (Caraher, 2010). Though the
leadership of many organizations may not understand the
technology behind virtualization, they certainly understand
the importance of remaining technically relevant in their
chosen line of business. The ability to effectively adapt to
technological change has become a vital component of
organizational leadership (Kearns, 2004), and the benefits
virtualization promises-financial savings, energy savings,
more effective disaster recovery, and lower administrative
overhead-have organizational leaders appetites whetted.
Hardware virtualization possesses three key features
which are the source for its unique benefits. Encapsulation
occurs when the hypervisor keeps all components of a VM,
including the OS, applications and all virtual hardware,
combined in a single logical unit (Price, 2008).
Encapsulation allows multiple VMs to reside on a single
host without stepping on one another's toes. The VMs are
therefore logically isolated from one another despite residing
on the same physical hardware. Interposition occurs when
the hypervisor manages all privileged operations to the
hardware and intercepts I/Os via I/0 abstraction, thus
presenting a single set of resources to multiple virtual
machines (Price, 2008). The hypervisor, in effect, manages

resources in such a way that they appear to the guest OS as a
real piece of hardware rather than abstracted hardware.
Resources on one physical host are therefore shared among
multiple VMs. Considering that only five to eight percent of
traditional servers' resources are used (Plas, 2007), resource
sharing, as interposition is sometimes called, enables the
physical server's hardware to be fully utilized. The
hypervisor can also allocate and retract resources based on
what a particular VM needs at a given time, thus resulting in
better utilization of resources. Introspection provides
monitoring and auditing capabilities unique to virtualization.
Because the monitoring and auditing takes place outside the
confines of the encapsulated VM, audit logging and process
monitoring, oftentimes the first target of an attacker, cannot
be tampered with in the event the VM is compromised
(Scafone, Souppaya, & Hoffman, (2010). Additionally,
introspection can modify a guest's state (King, Chen,
Verbowski, Wang & Lorch, 2006), including capturing an
image of a VM at a specified time, called a snapshot,
applying patches to a VM, or mounting file systems to a
VM. Each one of these features provides unique benefits.
Table 1lists each benefit and the feature(s) that correspond
to it:
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TABLE l
Benefits Unique to Hardware Virtualization

Name
Recovery
Time

Description
VM portability introduces new
methods for recovering systems in
the event of a fail ure or a disaster.

Technology
Encapsulation

./
./
./

System
Provisioning

Administrative
Overhead

VMs can be quickly provisioned
from a predefined template,
allowing for image
standardization including system
hardening and baselining
Centralized management of
multiple systems within a single
virtual infrastructure via the
virtual management system

Encapsulation
Interposition

./

Encapsulation
Interposition
Introspection

./

./

Power
Consumption

./

By hosting multiple VMs on a
single piece of hardware, fewer
physical resources are required
per datacenter

Encapsulation
Interposition

Hardware
Overhead

By hosting multiple VMs on a
single piece of hardware, fewer
physical servers are required

Interposition

./

Security
Auditing and
Inspection

The hypervisor provides a lower
layer from which VM security
logging, auditing, and intrusion
detection and prevention can be
performed

Introspection

./

VMs can be frozen at a specific
point in time (called a snapshot),
retuned to a point in tline, and
prior system activity that was
recorded can be replayed after the
attack has occurred

Encapsulation
Introspection

Security
Forensics

./

./

./

./

Benefit
Reducedrecoverytline
objective (RTO)
Increased recovery point
objectives (RPOs)
Reduction in fiscal cost for
disaster recovery site
Reduction in fiscal cost
during the setup and
maintenance of deployed
physical systems
Reduction in fiscal cost of
administering multiple
physical systems, including,
patching, system monitoring,
and system recovery
Reduction of system
downtime due to multiple
services running on a single
physical server
Reduction in fiscal cost for
power consumption
Potential savings for
qualifying Green IT
Initiatives (Symantec, 2010)
Reduction of fiscal cost for
the purchasing, maintenance,
and support of physical
servers
A more secure environment
can be constructed by
logging and auditing outside
theVM
Intrusion prevention and
detection can monitor
systems more effectively by
leveraging the hypervisor
Forensic analysis of a
compromised system 'is
greatly enhanced by the
ability to replay attacks
System recovery from a
compromise is greatly
enhanced by the use of
snapshots
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RISKS UNIQUE TO YIRTUALIZATION

However, by opening a communication channel between the
host and VM, it also creates another attack vector for
attackers to exploit (King, Chen, Verbowski, Wang &
Lorch, 2006). A virtual-machine based rootkit (VMBR), for
example, could be used by an attacker to exploit the
hypervisor in order to gain access to a guest, thus breaking
down the security framework on which virtualization is
built. Though there is currently no known VMBR that can
bypass the isolation provided by the hardware virtualization
architecture, King, et al. (2006) showed with the creation of
SubVirt that it is possible to do so using software
virtualization. It is likely only a matter of time until the
attack vectors created by introspection are exploited in
hardware virtualization (Price, 2008).
Though some risks are unique to virtualization, a
number of other risks are common to both virtualization and
traditional hardware servers, but manifested themselves in
different ways. For example, unhardened and misconfigured
systems are a vulnerability of both virtual and physical
servers. However, a virtual infrastructure presents additional
hardening and configuration concerns due to the additional
components involved, e.g., the host machine, virtual
switches, and how those components interrelate with the
guest OSs (Scafone, Souppaya, & Hoffman, 2010). Such
layers of complexity only prove to further complicate an
analysis of the risks of virtualization. One must not only
account for vulnerabilities unique to virtualization, but also
account for those traditional vulnerabilities that are
exacerbated by virtualization. Though this realization
complicates the risk analysis, acknowledgment is a critical
piece to fully understanding the unique characteristics of
virtualization as opposed to traditional server
implementations. Table 2 provides an overview of the
vulnerabilities unique to virtualization in addition to those
traditional vulnerabilities that are exacerbated by
virtualization:

Paradoxically, the same features that are the source for
virtualization's unique benefits-encapsulation,
interposition, and introspection- are also the source for its
unique vulnerabilities. As is often the case, additional layers
of technology that provide greater power and ease-of-use
also create additional vulnerabilities (Scafone, Souppaya, &
Hoffman, 2010). Encapsulation, for example, allows VMs
to be highly portable, able to be quickly moved from one
piece of hardware to another (Chen & Noble, 2001 ). Such
portability drastically reduces the recovery time objective
(RTO) while also reducing the fiscal cost of maintaining
recovery sites with one-to-one hardware for each physical
server. However, such portability also creates an attack
vector by allowing the theft of entire systems via replication
of the VMs' disk image files over a network (Price, 2008).
Such attack vectors do not exist with traditional servers
because they are directly tied to the server hardware on
which the OS is installed. Though interposition greatly
reduces admi'nistrative overhead by allowing VMs to be
quickly provisioned from a predefined template, it also
opens the door for administrative misuse resulting in what's
called VM sprawl, or the proliferation of VMs due to the
ease of provisioning inherent in virtualization (Scafone,
Souppaya, & Hoffman, 2010). If an organization does not
manage its system provisioning using the appropriate change
controls, any number of compromised VMs could easily be
deployed from a corrupt template. Likewise, VMs lacking
the appropriate hardening and baselining measures could be
put on the wire and into production. Though this is also true
with traditional servers, the ease with which VMs can be
provisioned in a virtual infrastructure increases the
likelihood of a corrupt system being introduced into the
environment. By leveraging the hypervisor to monitor and
audit VMs, introspection provides a unique method for
detecting and preventing intrusion (Chen & Noble, 2001).
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TABLE2
Risks Unique to Hardware Virtualization
Vulnerability

VM Portability

Virtual Machine
Based Rootkit
(VMBR)& VM
Escape

Unhardened or
Misconfigured
System

VM Sprawl

Virtual
Communication
Channels

Natural or
Manmade Disaster

Description
Encapsulation of VMs into a single set of files
enables them to be highly portable. Where
traditional systems were tied to a specific piece
of hardware, VMs are not and can be quickly
transported, even in a running state.
The host system adds an additional layer of
technology which must be accounted for when
securing the infrastructure. A VMBR installs
an additional, ultrathin virtual machine monitor
between the VM and host, thus allowing it to
go undetected by the VM.
This is no different than a traditional system
being compromised, however with
virtualization there are additional layers of
technology (namely the virtual host, virtual
networking, virtual storage, and the
interrelatedness to the VMs) that must be
accounted for.
Because VMs are so easy to provision when
compared to physical servers, the likelihood of
unpatched and misconfigured systems being
deployed is increased. Likewise, the likelihood
of VMs being deployed without going through
the proper change control measures is
increased.
Much of the communication that occurs
between the host and VMs, and between VMs
residing on the same host, cannot be monitored
by traditional methods. For example, two VMs
located on the same host communicate via a
virtual switch, yet that network traffic never
leaves the host's internal bus.
Because multiple VMs reside on a single host,
or host cluster, the failure of a piece of
hardware will effect multiple systems.

RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY

Example of Threat
Theft of VM from compromised host

SubVirt, Blue Pill

Compromise of an unpatched system

Multiple VMs being created from an
infected template

Network intrusion detection system
does not flag suspicious traffic
between two VMs located on the
same host.

20 VMs fail due to a power surge that
brings down a single server rack of
hosts machines

qualitative risk assessment method was chosen primarily due
to the desire for a broad perspective of the risks associated
with virtualization- a perspective built from the literature
and research that had been done and not tied to any specific
implementation or historical data. A view of the risks
unique to virtualization was sought as a phenomenon in toto,
from the general to the specific. In accordance to SP 80030, risk-level matrix (Table 3) and risk scale tables (Table 4)
were created and provide an initial starting point for the risk
analysis.

In order to effectively perform a risk vs. benefit analysis
for hardware virtualization, a framework must be chosen on
which to build the investigation. NIST's SP 800-30 Risk
Management Guide for Information Technology Systems
provides just such a framework that can be used by the
general public for a wide range of assessments (Harris,
2008). Comparing the vulnerabilities of hardware
virtualization and the methods and controls available to
mitigate them with its benefits will allow us to determine if
virtualization is truly a secure datacenter solution. A
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TABLE3
Risk Level Matrix
Threat Likelihood
High (1.0)
Medium (0.5)
Low (0.1)

Low (10)
Low: 10 X 1.0 = 10
Low: 10 X 0.5 = 5
Low: 10 X 0.1 = 1

Impact
Medium (50)
Medium: 50 X 1.0 = 50
Low: 50 X 0.5 = 25
Low: 50 X 0.1 = 5

High (100)
High: 100 X 1.0 = 100
Medium: 100 X 0.5 =50
Low: 100 X 0.1 = 10

TABLE4
Risk Scale
Risk Level
High

Medium

Low

Risk Description
If a hardware virtualization risk is evaluated as a high risk, the risk may prohibit the
implementation of virtualization if the likelihood is high, or if corrective measures
are not available to eliminate or properly mitigate the risk.
If a hardware virtualization risk is evaluated as a medium risk, the risk may deter the
implementation of virtualization if the likelihood is high, or if corrective measures
are not available to eliminate or properly mitigate the risk.
If a hardware virtualization risk is evaluated as a low risk, corrective measures are
recommended in order to mitigate the risk
underway, yet only 25% of server workloads expected to be
virtualized by the end of 2010 (Caraher, 2010), many
organizations are asking the same question, " Is virtualization
a viable, safe solution?" (Pias, 2007).
The risk level table below illustrates our findings from
the Literature using the risk level matrix and risk scale tables.
The values assigned for the likelihood and magnitude of
impact of the vulnerabilities were determined fro m the
research we performed and are found in Table 5.

RISK VERSUS BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Now that the benefits and risks unique to hardware
virtualization have been defined, and a framework
established on which to build the risk analysis, we must now
perform the qualitative risk analysis, and from those results
determine if hardware virtualization provides a secure, costeffective datacenter solution. With more than 80% of
o rganizations with some sort of virtualization project

TABLES
Virtual Environment Qualitative Risk Level Values
Vulnerability
VM Po rtability
Virtual Machine Based
Rootkit (VMBR)
Unhardened or
Misconfigured System
VM Sprawl
Virtual Communication
Channels
Natural or Manmade
Disaster

Likelihood
Medium

Magnitude of
Impact
High

Low

High

100x0.1

Medium

Medium

50x0.5

High

Low

High

Low

=25
10xl.O = 10
10xl.O = 10

Low

High

lOOxO.l

Likelihood/Impact Score
50xl.O =50

=10

=10

Risk
Level
50
10
25
10
10
10
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Though Table 5 gives us a very basic idea of the
likelihood and magnitude of impact for the vulnerabilities, it
does not account for their mitigation. Without such
information a true comparison of the benefits and risks is not
possible. A mitigated risk scale is needed in order to
evaluate the numeric values of each risk after mitigation
controls are applied. Once we have the qualitative risk value

for each of the vulnerabilities, we will assign values to each
mitigation control and apply them to the numeric values for
each risk. This is important for evaluating if the risk
associated with virtualization warrants the benefits it has to
offer. Table 6 associates the mitigated risk values with a
meaningful explanation that will ultimately be used to
determine if the risk outweighs the benefit.

TABLE6
Mitigated Risk Scale
Mitigated Risk Value
Very High
15.01 and above

High
10.01 - 15.00

Medium
5.01- 10.00

Low
0 - 5.00

Mitigated Risk Description
If a virtualization mitigated risk is evaluated as 15.01 or higher, almost no
correlating organizational benefit will outweigh the amount of risk associated
with the implementation of this element. Extreme care must be taken in
implementing this element to minimize exposure to the risk.
If a virtualization mitigated risk is evaluated as 10.01 - 15.00, the correlating
organizational benefit must be very strong. Extreme care must be taken in
implementing this element to ensure the proper mitigation steps have been
performed.
If a virtualization mitigated risk is evaluated as 5.01 - 10.00, the correlating
organizational benefit must be relatively strong. Moderate care must be taken in
implementing this element to ensure the proper mitigation steps have been
performed.
If a virtualization mitigated risk is evaluated as 0 - 5.00, the correlating
organizational benefit can be of moderate value.

Now we must determine the mitigated risk value for
each of the vulnerabilities we've identified. We will be able
to use these values to determine the significance of the
vulnerability as it relates to the benefits the organization will
receive fTOm implementing virtualization. The table below
takes the vulnerability and its associated risk level, and then
describes the mitigation controls for each to determine the
mitigated risk level. Each mitigation step is assigned a

numeric value ranging from 0 to 1. Numeric assignments
closer to 0 provide a greater amount of mitigation, while
those closer to 1 do an inferior job of mitigating the
vulnerability. Vulnerabilities with more than one mitigation
control have the mitigation value of each control applied to
the risk level value to determine the final mitigated risk
value as shown in Table 7.
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TABLE7
Virtual Environment Mitigated Risk Level Values

Vulnerability

Risk Level
Value

VM Portability

25

Virtual Machine
Based Rootkit
(VMBR)

10

Unhardened or
Misconfigured
System

25

VM Sprawl

10

Virtual
Communication
Channels

10

Natural or
Manmade
Disaster

10

Mitigation
Controls

Mitigation
Score

Mitigated Risk
Value

Physical security of storage
area where VMs are kept (.8)
./ Strict access controls applied to
encapsulated VMs so that only
authorized users have access (.4
)
./ Network perimeter controls
applied to limit minimize
external access to VMs (.9)
./ Policies and procedures in
place to minimize the
likelihood of VMs being copied
to unauthorized target (.7)
./ Ensure systems are kept up-todate with the latest patches,
anti-virus definitions, etc. (.4)
./ Install virtual-specific host
based intrusion detection or
prevention systems (.7)
./ Development of ultra-thin
hypervisors reduces the risk of
VMBR (.9)
./ Ensure proper change control
process is in place for system,
changes, hardening, and
monitoring (.4)
./ Create systems from "golden"
template that is configured
according to organizational
security standards (.7)
./ Ensure proper change control
process is in place for new
system deployment (.4)
./ Monitor environment to track
new systems being created (.6)
./ Ensure proper change control
process is in place for creation
and management of virtual
environment (.4)
./ Utilize virtualized-specific
security tools to monitor and
manage virtual communication
channels (.7)
./ Setup offsite disaster recovery
site for fault tolerance (.3)
./ Configure local resources in
such a way to minimize power
disruptions (.9)

.8x.4x.9x.7x50
= 10.08

10.08

.4x.7x.9x10 =
1.40

2.52

=5.00

7.00

./

.4x.7x25

.4x.6x10

2.40

.4x.7x10 = 2.80

2.80

.3x.9x10 = 2.70

2.70
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We now have all the pieces in place so we can evaluate
whether the benefits of implementing a hardware
virtualization infrastructure are warranted given the unique
risks associated with it. As mentioned earlier, the goal is to
perform a holistic analysis that includes both virtualization
risk management and virtualization's benefits as they relate
to organizational needs. To do this, we must look at the
mitigated risks of virtualization while also keeping in mind
its benefits. Hence, we are not only evaluating the security
aspects of hardware virtualization, but also the impact the
benefits ofvirtualization will have on an organization's

business objectives and the fulfillment of its mission. The
table below summarizes the findings by pulling together the
results of the information we have gathered thus far. Most
of the vulnerabilities can be directly associated to a benefit
by connecting the two via the virtualization technology they
have in common. For example, the vulnerability of VM
Portability can be correlated to the benefit Recovery Time
because both use the underlying technology of
Encapsulation. It should be noted, however, that not all
vulnerabilities correlate directly to a benefit. These are noted
in Table 8 and evaluated on their own individual merit.

TABLES
Hardware Virtualization Risk versus Benefit Analysis

Vulnerability
VM Portability

Benefit
Recovery Time

Virtual Machine Based
Rootkit (VMBR) &
VM Escape

Null

Mitigated
Risk Value
High
10.08

Low
2.52

Determination
VM Portability has a high mitigated risk
value; however the benefit of recovery
time, especially during disaster recovery
planning and in calculating the RTOs and
RPOs for critical systems, is an enormous
benefit. Extraordinary care must be taken
during the testing, development, and
implementation of the virtual infrastructure
to ensure the risks associated with VM
portability are addressed using physical
security and access control; however the
benefit will outweigh the risk for most
organizations.
There is no clear benefit associated with
VMBRs, so an organization would have to
be willing to accept this risk as part of their
hardware virtualization implementation,
and ensure the appropriate security controls
are built into it. Properly patching,
configuring and using standard best
practices, like disabling unnecessary
hardware and services, goes a long way in
reducing the risk of VMBR and VM
Escape. Because the mitigated risk level is
low, and other benefits very high, this is a
risk most organizations would be willing to
accept.
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Vulnerability
Unhardened or
Misconfigured System

Benefit
Administrative
Overhead

VM Sprawl

System Provisioning

Mitigated
Risk Value
Medium
7.00

Low
2.40

Virtual Communication
Channels

Security Auditing
and Inspection

Low
2.80

Determination
Bill Hau notes that the virtualization risks
are not solely comprised of technical
problems. Like any information
technology, it requires people to be trained
and processes put in place to ensure system
security is developed properly and
maintained (Hau, 2007). Though
technology of virtualization might require
unique procedures for hardening and
configuring the virtual environment, the
methods for doing so are no different than
any other technology. The fiscal savings
from being able to centrally manage,
monitor, and audit multiple VMs adds
further value.
Again, this is more of a "people and
processes" (Hau, 2007) issue than a
technical risk. Ironically, one of the major
strengths of virtualization, i.e., the ability to
provision a system in a matter of minutes,
has the potential for becoming a major
vulnerability if not managed properly.
Security must be built into the virtual
infrastructure from the beginning, and a
major part of that is having the proper
procedures and change controls in place to
maintain a secure environment. Add to that
the benefit of using a golden template that
is hardened and configured to an
organization's standards as the base image
for all VM deployments and the benefits far
outweigh the risks.
Introspection and interposition are two of
the more powerful features of the
hypervisor; however this technology opens
a whole new attack vector that can be
exploited by the bad guys. Nonetheless,
the likelihood of such an exploit on a
properly hardened and patched system is
relatively low. And the benefit of being
able to use the hypervisor to audit and
inspect VMs from outside the guest OS
using virtual communication channels
provides security professionals new ways
for monitoring VMs and dealing with
compromised systems.
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Mitigated
Risk Value
Low
2.70

Vulnerability
Natural or Manmade
Disaster

Benefit
Recovery Time

Null

Hardware Overhead

Null

Null

Security Forensics

Null

Null

Power Consumption

Null

Determination
As mentioned in VM Portability in this
table, the benefit of recovery time,
especially during disaster recovery
planning and in calculating the RTOs and
RPOs for critical systems, is an enormous
benefit. The dreaded financial costs of hot
sites and cold sites are greatly reduced
because so much less hardware needs to be
purchased. Multiple VMs can share a
single piece of hardware, thus drastically
reducing the fiscal cost of buying and
maintaining one-to-one physical servers
and the offsite rental space to house those
servers. This is one of the primary benefits
that organizations seek when first
evaluating hardware virtualization.
There is no vulnerability for needing less
hardware in a datacenter. In fact, just the
opposite. From a security perspective, less
hardware means less firmware that can be
compromised, less downtime due to
hardware failure, and perhaps even fewer
physical security requirements, such as
physically secured server and network
racks. From a fiscal perspective, less
hardware means big monetary savings.
This is another benefit which CIO's and
CFO's happily embrace.
Giving a forensics investigator the ability to
replay system attacks is a huge advantage
when trying to determine how a system was
compromised. Likewise, being able to roll
back a compromised system to a previous,
uninfected state via a snapshot greatly
reduces the recovery time for a
compromised system. Rather than having
to rebuild the system using a backup or
some other method, an uncompromised
system can be restored in a matter of
minutes rather than hours or even days.
There is no vulnerability associated with
this benefit.

Another benefit CIOs and CFOs gladly
embrace is the fiscal savings brought about
by having to provide power to fewer
systems. The difference between having to
power 20 physical servers versus one
virtual host with 20 VMs adds up quicker
than one might expect. Joe Vanden Plas
estimates the savings could be as much as
$3,000 per processor (Plas, 2007). Big
savings indeed.
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CONCLUSION

Platform as a Service (Paas) and Software as a Service
(SaaS) is built. Green IT, once considered desirable, is now
considered essential by most organizations (Symantec,
2009), and virtualization provides the bedrock on which a
greener IT is built. It has given disaster recovery, once the
bane of CFOs around the world due to its costly nature and
its seemingly improbable purpose, a much needed face lift.
Overworked in a down economy, system administrators,
with technologies like snapshots, hot migrations, storage
migrations, and VM templates, respond to requests for new
servers and system patching with a smile and a wink instead
of a grunt and moan. The social relevance of hardware
virtualization, though perhaps not fully understood at this
point in its development, is undoubtedly a technical force to
be reckoned with. As Bill Hau states, virtualization "may
very well be one of those revolutionary paradigms that could
fundamentally change the way we think about and approach
computing." (Hau, 2007). Paradigm or not, virtualization is
having a profound impact and is likely here to stay. It is our
duty as security professionals to ensure that it is secure.

The risk versus benefit analysis demonstrations that
virtualization can provide a secure, highly beneficial
technology on which datacenters can be built. Though it
does possess unique risks in addition to exacerbating
traditional risks, the likelihood of those vulnerabilities being
exploited is greatly reduced through appropriate mitigation.
Special care and a thorough understanding of the technology
and security best practices are required for the proper
implementation of a virtual infrastructure. Like any project,
organizations must bake security into the testing,
development, and implementation of their virtualization
plans rather than attempting to secure the environment after
the fact. Including security in the initial project
development, through its implementation, and making it a
key element of ongoing maintenance, is an integral
component of successfully securing any system (Conklin &
White, 2010), and virtualization is no exception.
Perhaps the most daunting aspect of securing a virtual
infrastructure is the complexity of the system. Virtualization
adds layers of technology to a datacenter (Scafone,
Souppaya, & Hoffman, 2010). Not only must you secure the
server OS, but also the host OS, hypervisor, virtual network,
virtual hardware, virtual management system, on down the
line, while also securing the virtual communication channels
on which all these components communicate. Of course, the
perplexing terminology of virtualization, with different
companies and researchers referring to the same technology
with different names, doesn't help. Nonetheless, a thorough
understanding of the technology behind virtualization,
knowing the ingredients that make the special sauce perform
its magic, is crucial to being able to properly secure a virtual
infrastructure.
Most surprising is the paradoxical nature of
virtualization (Price, 2008). Many of the technologies that
make it unique are both the source of security risks and the
foundation for its unique benefits. As Jenni Susan Reuben
(2007) puts it, "virtualization is both an opportunity and a
threat." The technology of virtualization is truly a doubleedged sword that cuts both ways, for better and for worse.
This is yet another reason why it's so important to have a
firm understanding of the technology, and to incorporate
security and security processes into the planning stages.
What may at first appear to be a great fiscal and
administrative godsend might quickly spiral into a security
nightmare without proper hardening, mitigation, policies,
and procedures.
Virtualization will likely be seen as a paradigm shift for
the way datacenter architectures are configured and
managed. Better utilization of hardware, lower maintenance
and renewal costs, increased availability and portability, and
a smaller carbon footprint are just a few of the benefits of
virtualization. It is the cornerstone of cloud computing's
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) (Scafone, Souppaya, &
Hoffman, 2010), and provides the foundation from which
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